Despite concerted effort to improve quality and safety, high reliability remains a distant goal. Although this likely reflects the challenge of organizational change, persistent controversy over basic issues suggests that weaknesses in conceptual models may contribute. The essence of operational improvement is organizational learning. This article presents a framework for identifying leverage points for improvement based on organizational learning theory and applies it to an analysis of current practice and controversy. Organizations learn from others, from defects, from measurement, and from mindfulness. These learning modes correspond with contemporary themes of collaboration, no blame for human error, accountability for performance, and managing the unexpected. The collaborative model has dominated improvement efforts. Greater attention to the underdeveloped modes of organizational learning may foster more rapid progress in patient safety by increasing organizational capabilities, strengthening a culture of safety, and fixing more of the process problems that contribute to patient harm.
Article
Health care leaders worldwide have struggled to make measurable progress in patient safety. Daunted by the requirements for high reliability (see Table 1 ) and the large gap between current performance and the putative target of zero preventable harm, many still scoff at the suggestion that it is achievable. Even so, zero preventable harm is increasingly embraced as the only acceptable long-term goal. Although the slow progress likely reflects the overall difficulty of initiating and sustaining organizational change, the field is characterized by persistent controversy regarding basic issues such as how to identify specific clinical practices suitable for widespread adoption, 1,2 whether efforts should focus on medical injuries or errors, 3, 4 and whether we need to shift the balance between no blame and accountability. 5 These controversies may signify inadequacies in the field's theoretical framework.
Steps have been taken to develop conceptual frameworks for patient safety research, 6 to reduce preventable harm, 7 to engage physicians in quality and safety at academic medical centers, 8 and in the measurement of reliability in hospitals. 9 Emanuel et al reviewed the intellectual history of patient safety and presented a highlevel descriptive model focused on 4 domains: workers, recipients, the care delivery process, and methods for feedback/improvement. 10 In addition, Chassin and Loeb put forward an empirical framework for addressing the challenge of high reliability and subsequently worked with a limited number of hospital leaders to map out a 14 × 4 matrix of characteristics for assessing progress. 11 Although these tools are useful for specific purposes, they have not served to resolve basic controversies. Leaders could still benefit from a graphic model to make visible leverage points for improvement and assist with communication of the imperative for change. The essence of operational improvement is organizational learning. Therefore, this article offers a framework for thinking deeply about patient safety in terms of organizational learning theory and applies it to a brief analysis of the current state and these unresolved controversies.
Proposed Model
The concept of the learning organization stemmed from Argyris's work on personal and organizational effectiveness, which focused on how individuals design their actions to achieve the intended results in challenging situations. 12 It was later popularized by Senge who integrated it with general systems theory. 13 Organizational learning theory evolved contemporaneously with and is linked to the quality management revolution pioneered by Juran, Deming, Crosby, and others, which focused primarily on business processes. Because organizational learning also comes with a rich theoretical and practical literature, it offers a natural organizing principle for thinking about safety improvement. Moreover, the concept of organizational learning neatly captures the major themes that have emerged in the health care safety conversation in correspondence to the 4 major sources or modes of organizational learning (Figure 1) .
The 4 major modes of organizational learning are (1) learning from the experiences of others as revealed in conversations and publications; (2) learning from the work of identifying and analyzing process defects; (3) learning from the use of process and outcomes measures to provide feedback and drive the organization's performance management system; and (4) learning from the results of responses to unexpected threats to quality and safety. The major themes include collaboration, no blame for human error, accountability for performance, and situational mindfulness. The system context includes leadership as reflected in management priorities and practices and shaped by governance oversight; staff knowledge, skills, and capabilities; the financial, physical, and technological infrastructure; and the organizational culture.
Collaboration
Of the 4 modes of organizational learning, learning from others clearly dominates current practice. The multifacility collaborative model has supported the most visible and successful work in patient safety. In addition, published literature has long been a rich source for improvement ideas and methods, enabling learning across organizations and national boundaries. Much value also has come to health care from study of other industries. In addition, normative databases are increasingly available as a means of benchmarking and best practice identification.
Compared to initiating de novo work on organizational processes, it is easy to participate in a multifacility collaborative or to extract ideas from published literature. There is safety in community and in following the paved road. By comparison, innovation and tests of changethe essence of learning from defects (a key piece of general learning from experience, including mistakes and successes)-are higher risk activities. They require courage, insight, and a sense of ownership in addition to quality improvement knowledge and teamwork skills. The relative convenience of learning from others may have inadvertently contributed to the relative neglect of other modes of learning. It also may be that insufficient research effort has been applied to develop new content applicable to those modes.
Although some element of trial and error is required to adapt recommended practices to the local environment, for many the greatest challenge in collaborative learning is sustaining and spreading improvements across the organization. Conceptually, this is equivalent to translating learning across levels: from the individual and team/ microsystem to the larger organization. Although the collaborative model has been invoked primarily to facilitate adoption of specific safety practices, it also could serve to advance best practices for the other modes of organizational learning.
No Blame for Human Error
The principle of no blame for human error remains sacrosanct, but is difficult to uphold day to day. Defects are most often a property of the system and are infrequently the fault of individual workers. Therefore, the blame commonly cast on the individuals found at the "sharp end" of an adverse event demoralizes staff and poisons improvement efforts. Regardless, stress allows gut reactions to trump higher brain processes so that most organizations have been challenged to successfully hardwire a Administrators consistently underestimate the extent to which the problem prevails. The consistency of scores demonstrates that we have perfected a system for casting blame.
All the while, defects in the process of care remain endemic. They point to persistent weaknesses in event identification and analysis. This is unfortunate because systematic organizational learning from adverse events can improve safety, 14, 15 and the results can be sustained over time (A. M. Wolff, personal e-mail communication, August 1, 2007) . Roughly 6% of hospitalized Medicare patients in the United States suffer a preventable adverse event. 16 Comparable rates have been reported in other countries. If one considers that serious latent process defects also may be associated with near misses and no harm events, then the learning opportunity is even greater.
Typical event reporting systems identify only about 10% of adverse events. 17 More robust, but inefficient and labor-intensive methods such as the Institute for Healthcare Improvement Global Trigger Tool are not a practical solution for routine event identification. On the other hand, where rapid response teams are in place, calls for help are easily identified and tracked. Review of factors contributing to unexpected patient decline may offer fertile ground for improvement. [18] [19] [20] Even when events are identified, improvement cannot occur unless they are subject to meaningful analysis and corrective actions. Argyris and Schön observed that efforts at error detection and correction often fail because they act like a single-loop thermostat, while organizational learning is better fostered though a "double-loop" process that also involves questioning the organization's underlying norms, policies, and objectives. 21 Here too, most organizations fall short. The effectiveness of root cause analysis, the resource-intensive mainstay of investigation for serious adverse events, has never been validated. As commonly practiced, the exercise tends to generate weak improvement recommendations, inconsistent implementation, and inadequate follow-up to assure risk reduction. 22, 23 A streamlined method of root cause analysis potentially applicable to a larger number of events has been described, but its effectiveness has not been evaluated. 24 Clinical peer review is the other important approach to event analysis. It is broadly applied among physicians in hospitals worldwide. It also may be used by other disciplines. In contrast to root cause analysis of serious events, it consumes few resources. It may be the most common method of event analysis. The median estimated case volume is 1% to 2% of hospital inpatient volume. 25 Most programs still rely on "generic screens" for substandard care to identify cases worthy of review even though this strategy lacks validity. 26, 27 The relationship of weaknesses in event identification and analysis with the persistence of a blame culture has not been adequately appreciated. Another option to improve event identification goes to the heart of the matter. Clinicians invariably know when a patient suffers an adverse event, but are too often reluctant to report for fear of reprisal. Over the past 25 years, aviation successfully advanced passenger safety in large measure by developing policies and procedures to promote and protect selfreporting by pilots. The benefits of self-reporting also have been demonstrated in health care but have not been widely adopted. 28, 29 The chief barrier to self-reporting among physicians appears to be the prevailing method of clinical peer review that focuses on whether the "standard of care" was met. It is perceived as punitive because the standard of care is associated with malpractice litigation and because the process conflates situational clinical performance with competence. Negative peer review findings pose a threat to clinical privileges and, therefore, livelihood. A nonpunitive best practice model that incorporates self-reporting and quality improvement principles has been well characterized and validated, but is infrequently applied. It warrants leadership attention. 29 The shift required to improve the peer-review process is small compared to the task of scaling up a novel method of event analysis. The essence of the change is moving from inquisition ("Is there evidence of substandard care?") to inquiry ("What can we learn from this case to improve clinical performance?"). Thus, clinical peer review may be the most promising vehicle to efficiently salvage the largest number of learning opportunities from defects in care.
At this time, it makes little sense to argue whether improvement efforts should focus on medical injuries or errors when there is strong theoretical and practical evidence that there is a bigger payoff to eliminate the blame game and reward self-reporting. Moreover, it is not a simple either/or choice. If the goal is zero preventable harm and resources are limited, the central issue for setting priorities is a probabilistic estimate involving (1) the frequency with which the clinical scenario occurs, (2) the likelihood that the process failure could recur, (3) the risk of harm given a recurrence, and (4) the resource cost of correction. "No harm, no foul" is not an appropriate rubric.
Some have advocated the equivalent of a National Transportation Safety Board for health care that would bring outside expertise to bear on major safety failures and issue "Red Cover" reports to widely disseminate recommendations for improvement. 30 In terms of the organizational learning model, such an agency would serve to augment learning from defects at each targeted institution and accelerate learning from others nationwide. It would extend work already being done by the Joint Commission through its Sentinel Event policy, Sentinel Event Alerts, and National Patient Safety Goals, as well as work by patient safety organizations, various medical specialty societies, and others.
Accountability for Clinical Performance and Behavioral Choices
Health care organizations also have struggled to improve clinical performance by learning from measurement, most visibly in relation to unprofessional behaviors 31 and noncompliance with widely accepted safety-related practices. 5 Better progress has been made in the area of procedural outcomes, particularly where there is mandated reporting. The improvement opportunities are typically greatest at the program level. The study of practice variation can reveal both high and low performance.
Although blatantly reckless disregard for patient safety is thankfully rare among health care professionals and staff workers, it mandates prompt intervention whenever it occurs. Much more problematic is the gray zone characterized by unconscious drift into risky choices conditioned by normalization of deviance, situational factors, and the need to work around problematic processes. This calls for correction of poorly designed processes, strategies to bring awareness to drift, and targeted management action to rein in habitual deviation.
The Joint Commission standards promulgated in 2008 that mandated focused initial and ongoing professional practice evaluation to supplement the biannual credentialing process have spurred efforts to better measure individual clinical performance. The typical strategy has been to rely on whatever can be extracted from administrative systems. The resulting measures have been more meaningful for evaluating procedural activity than cognitive performance.
This need not be the case. Performance measurement encompasses the subjective evaluations made by peers and managers, as well as the explicit data captured by information systems and manual abstraction. Robust methods for making subjective performance measurements are available. 32 For example, clinical performance measurements can be made during event analysis as has been demonstrated for peer review. 33 Such measures could be efficiently captured and used to increase accountability through feedback and performance management, without compromising the principle of no blame for human error. If we did a better job of linking performance measurement, data management, and feedback, we might be more successful at promoting selfcorrecting behaviors and, thereby, reduce the need for the more difficult performance management conversations.
This analysis forces the conclusion that it is not helpful to look for the appropriate balance of accountability and no blame. We need more of both.
Mindfulness of the Unexpected
The theme of mindfulness of the unexpected emerged from studies to identify the factors that fostered high reliability and safety in complex, dynamic, high-risk environments. 34 High reliability demands a culture of safety characterized by trust; the imperative to report and improve; and collective mindfulness of the high cost of process failure, the inevitability of human error, and the need to identify, contain, and recover from errors as quickly as possible.
It combines the systematic pursuit of quality improvement with constant vigilance for the unexpected. The skill of managing the unexpected well is underdeveloped largely because it requires a counterintuitive act: a strong response to a weak signal. The current trend to adopt the rapid response team model to mobilize the resources needed to manage deteriorating patients takes a giant step in the right direction.
Resilience, a key feature of high reliability organizations, is expressed as the capability to detect, contain, and bounce back from errors as they arise. Given the high rate of adverse events and their human impact, resilience is needed both at the personal and organizational levels. The second victim phenomenon can have devastating effects on health care personnel. 35 Spontaneous self-blame does not need to be amplified by the organizational response. In seeking to consciously restrain and retrain reflexive reactions, which might otherwise cast blame for human error, the leadership might go a step further by providing compassionate support to the involved individuals.
Process Improvement
The 4 modes of learning affect patient safety through the final common pathway of process improvement, whether at the organizational, microsystem, or individual workhabits level. Health care organizations have gained increasing fluency and sophistication with process improvement methods over the past decade. This includes enterprise-level coordination, support, management, and oversight of improvement activity. Still, only a handful of organizations have fully committed to training and engaging all staff in the improvement process so that the general capacity for improvement is limited and implementation of process change remains a challenge. 36 Personal habits are analogous to organizational processes. It takes sustained attention and effort to change personal habits and routines. There is growing appreciation that this is rooted in the biology of the human nervous system. Insofar as all organizational change requires some members to adopt new habits and insofar as most efforts at major organizational change fail throughout the business world, of necessity, our understanding of how to promote and support process change must continue to evolve.
In this context, the painfully slow improvement in patient safety is understandable, but not condonable and the concern over how best to identify specific clinical practices suitable for widespread adoption appears misplaced. Institute for Healthcare Improvement, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, the Joint Commission, and many others have done much to develop evidence for and raise awareness of best practices. Hospital leaders have adopted them about as fast as their infrastructure and competing priorities can support. Until they increase investment in the infrastructure for improvement, knowledge of what to do will far exceed the capacity for change.
Organizational Factors
This conceptual model sets the 4 modes of learning within a 4-sided frame of governance oversight; leadership behaviors; the physical, technological, and financial environment; and organizational culture, capabilities, and resilience. All of these framing factors are interdependent with the other elements of the model and may themselves be leverage points for improvement in patient safety. For example, even though trustees carry ultimate responsibility for organizational performance, effective governance activity is needed at other levels, particularly among medical and nursing staff.
This framework intentionally emphasizes process over structure. Form should follow function. Structure can be considered to fall within the purview of governance and leadership. Because organizational structure should logically support strategy, safety will not be the only driver. In any case, the hierarchical command and control model of organizational design is ill suited to produce the learning and the flexibility required for rapid change. That itself poses a challenge to many health care organizations.
Many think of leadership in terms of formal authority, but practically speaking, leadership is a behavior. Anyone in the organization, regardless of role, can exhibit leadership that contributes to improved safety. It is most desirable for frontline workers to be so engaged. Meanwhile, executives and managers may lack the training and skill to function effectively as leaders. Such deficiency can greatly constrain organizational capabilities and obstruct progress. This problem may be more common in health care than in other industries, especially among clinicians who acquire management responsibilities. If the key task of a learning organization is to develop improved thinking at all levels, leaders must play a critical enabling role through their daily interactions. 37 Executive walk-arounds have been promoted as one method to engage titled leaders in this work. 38 Development of strong, deep leadership also has potential to catalyze improved organizational performance. 39 The inadequacies of the performance management processes highlighted ultimately stem from deficiencies in leadership behaviors. Normalization of deviance is a compact description from the sociological literature of what happens in organizations when there is a high level of tolerance for undesirable behaviors, be they temper tantrums or erratic handwashing. The normalization of deviance is doubly problematic because it allows unsafe habits to be established that are difficult to change. In addressing such problems, leaders must use caution in their choice of models and language. "Justice" and "punishment" make good sense in a court of law, but do not evoke healthy emotions when applied to safety culture in health care. Algorithms to evaluate "blame-worthy" acts will inevitably be misapplied by frontline managers with serious unintended consequences for the organization.
Physical plant, technology, and finances are the more tangible aspects of the infrastructure that potentially affect patient safety among hospitals worldwide. Financial challenges can limit the capacity to invest in technology and update the physical environment using evidence-based design. Still, the greatest danger may be in viewing technological or structural investments as a panacea, because they take years to implement and may bring their own unintended consequences. People and process remain the most critical and malleable components of the system of care.
Much has been written about organizational culture. It is the province of leadership. Although its limiting effects are pervasive, every successful clinical process improvement initiative helps advance a culture of safety. In some situations, work may need to be specifically directed toward building organizational learning capabilities as an essential adjunct for success. For example, the comprehensive unit-based safety program developed at Johns Hopkins was incorporated into Michigan's Keystone Intensive Care Unit project to stimulate culture shift prior to initiating efforts focused on care redesign. 40 
Organizational Self-Assessment
This framework will be of value only to the extent that health care leaders actually apply it. Major organizational improvement efforts naturally begin with assessment of the improvement opportunity and prioritization of goals. To support the pursuit of safer patient care, Table 2 presents a brief guide to self-assessment that draws out the key questions generated by the foregoing discussion. This is but a starting point for analysis. Health care organizations are both complex and varied, so the questions are intentionally open-ended. For those with a quantitative orientation, the suggested metrics also may stimulate reflection and discussion. 
Conclusions
Health care leaders who confront the basic requirements for achieving high reliability in quality and safety in light of the prevailing dysfunctional practices will open the door to transformation. It would be far better for such change to come from within than to be imposed by outside regulators under pressure from a disgruntled society waking up to the scale of preventable harm wrought by the industry. Lao Tzu saw that "the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step." Once the goal is set, the challenge is to take that first step. At a time when resources are constrained and multiple priorities compete for attention, leaders will ask, "How can we jump-start our ability to deliver consistent, mistake-free, harm-free clinical processes?" This organizational learning framework for patient safety uses the current language of management and provides a structure for identifying the most promising leverage points for improvement.
Although health care organizations need to invest in staff training and the related infrastructure to increase overall capacity for improvement work, this can be done incrementally. Most will benefit by taking concerted action to end the culture of blame and consciously foster a culture of safety. For this purpose, the greatest leverage may frequently be found by focusing initially on selfreporting of adverse events, near misses, and hazardous conditions-a visible, measurable behavior that epitomizes engagement in safety-in conjunction with adoption of best practices in event analysis and clinical peer review.
